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Abstract: 
Section 97 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 requires the addition of caste 
to the Equality Act 2010 by secondary legislation as ‘an aspect of’ the protected 
characteristic of race; but despite being mandated, no secondary legislation has been 
introduced and the addition of caste remains contested by some academics, civil society 
organisations, and politicians who question the adequacy of any definition of caste, the 
estimates of the extent of caste discrimination, and whether legal protection against caste 
discrimination already exists under the Equality Act. In this article we assess whether legal 
protection against caste discrimination is now assured following the Employment Tribunal 
judgment in September 2015 in Tirkey v Chandhok & Anor which held that discrimination on 
grounds of caste, depending on the facts, might be capable of falling within the scope of race 
as currently defined in the Equality Act. We argue that Tirkey is significant but not decisive 
and that it remains open to government to extend the Equality Act to cover caste.  
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1. Introduction 
In April 2010 there was mixed reaction – jubilation for some, dismay for others - at the 
inclusion of s. 9(5)(a) in the Equality Act 2010 (EA), an enabling provision which provided a 
power for caste to be added in the future, by secondary legislation, to s. 9(1) of the Act as 
‘an aspect of’ the protected characteristic of race, defined in the legislation as including 
colour, nationality, and ethnic or national origins. In April 2013, s. 97 of the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (ERRA) converted the ‘caste power’ in EA s. 9(5)(a) into a duty, 
thereby requiring government to introduce secondary legislation to add caste to race -  
although it gave no indication as to how this was to be done.1  In July 2013 the coalition 
government published a timetable for the introduction of the secondary legislation which 
included two public consultations on the proposed legislation, going up to and beyond the 
May 2015 General Election.2 A year later, in July 2014, with no consultation document 
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unveiled, the Government was questioned in Parliament about the delay. The Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for Women and Equalities, Helen Grant, explained that the UK’s 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) had originally intended to commission 
research to establish “baseline data” inter alia on the scale of caste discrimination in the UK, 
but had decided that such research might be intrusive and damaging to community relations. 
The Government was therefore conducting a study on the feasibility of carrying out such 
research;3 but as at the time of writing this study had not been published.4 No secondary 
legislation was introduced by the then Conservative - Lib-Dem coalition government (2010-
2015) and the Conservative government which came to power in May 2015 has not formally 
announced whether it intends to introduce legislation or not. In coalition the Conservatives 
were opposed to extending discrimination legislation to cover caste, and conceded to s. 97 
of the ERRA only because the government suffered a last-minute defeat on the issue in the 
House of Lords (Waughray, 2014). 5   At present, over five and a half years since the 
enactment of the EA there is still no statutory prohibition of caste discrimination in British 
discrimination law, and despite being mandated in 2013, the addition of caste in the EA 
remains highly contested. 
 
The existence of, first, a statutory power and subsequently a statutory duty to make caste an 
aspect of race in the EA has raised the visibility of caste as a ground of discrimination and 
has given rise on the one hand to an expectation of legal protection against caste 
discrimination, on the other hand to vocal opposition to the principle of introducing a 
statutory prohibition of caste discrimination in the UK. Against this backdrop, and in the 
absence of an explicit statutory prohibition of such discrimination, it was inevitable that 
claimants would seek to persuade the courts that caste is already covered by the EA under 
one or more existing protected characteristics. Since the EA came into force, UK 
Employment Tribunals have been asked to determine in two cases whether caste is or could 
be subsumed within race as currently defined, specifically within the concept of ethnic 
origins. In Naveed v Aslam in 2012 the Employment Tribunal held that it could not;6 but in 
Tirkey v Chandhok & Anor in September 2015 the Employment Tribunal held that the 
claimant was the victim of unlawful harassment on grounds of race and that her treatment 
was because of her ethnic origins, defined by reference to her inherited position in society (in 
whole or in part on the basis of her caste), her birth, and her upbringing.7 Tirkey is the first 
UK case in which caste has formed an element of a successful race discrimination claim, 
and the judgment was immediately hailed in the media as a legal landmark.8 However, it 
does not resolve the question of whether in principle caste falls within the scope of race in 
the EA as currently worded. Supporters of caste discrimination legislation argue that the 
outcome in Tirkey should not be used as an excuse to further delay or abandon introducing 
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a statutory prohibition of caste discrimination as mandated by parliament. Opponents of 
legislation, including the 2010-15 coalition government and the Conservative government of 
David Cameron, have argued that there is insufficient evidence of caste discrimination in the 
UK to justify legislation; that introducing statutory protection against caste discrimination is 
socially divisive and will damage community cohesion; and that caste is already covered 
within the scope of existing discrimination legislation, as shown by Tirkey. Organisations 
such as the Alliance of Hindu Organisations and the National Council of Hindu Temples UK 
further argue that the demand for caste discrimination legislation, and the outcome in Tirkey,  
reflect Christian evangelical denigration of what they have begun to term the global ‘Dharmic 
community’ (Hindus, Sikhs and Jains), 9  a phenomenon allegedly rooted in colonialism 
whose perpetrators have ‘created’ the ‘caste system’ (Shah, 2014) as representing the 
immorality and degeneracy, in their eyes, of Indic religions and cultures.10  
 
In this article we assess the current position vis a vis the legal regulation of caste 
discrimination. We ask whether legal protection against caste discrimination is now assured 
by the Tirkey judgment, or whether irrespective of the outcome in Tirkey the EA should be 
extended to cover caste. We argue that, notwithstanding the prevarication of successive 
governments on the introduction of caste legislation, an important impact of the change 
made in April 2013 to the EA was the creation of the climate in which the Tirkey case could 
be brought. We explain the political and legal background to the inclusion of the ‘caste 
power’ in EA s. 9(5)(a) and the circumstances which resulted in the power being converted, 
in 2013, into a duty to add caste; we introduce the concepts of caste and caste 
discrimination in the UK context; we take stock of legal developments since 2010, including 
an analysis and evaluation of the Tirkey judgment; and we conclude by reflecting on the 
alternative options available to the government to ensure legal protection against caste 
discrimination in accordance with its international law obligations. 
 
2.       Caste in the Equality Act 2010: Legal and Political Context11 
The movement to secure legal protection against caste discrimination in the UK gained 
momentum in the early 2000s against the backdrop of growing international awareness of 
discrimination on grounds of caste, coupled with frustration among Dalits (formerly known as 
‘Untouchables’) at the perceived lack of legal redress in Britain for such discrimination.12 
Caste is a prohibited ground of discrimination in the legal orders of a number of States, 
including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Burkina Faso, and Mauritius, but 
the term caste is not found in any international human rights instrument, and until its 
appearance in EA s. 9(5)(a) the term did not appear in UK discrimination law.13 In India, 
caste discrimination (alongside discrimination on grounds of religion, race, sex, and place of 
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birth) is prohibited in the 1950 Constitution of India (COI), drafted following independence in 
1947.14 The COI also abolishes ‘Untouchability’ and criminalises its practice,15 and provides 
for affirmative action measures for Scheduled Castes (the official administrative term for ex-
Untouchables) and Scheduled Tribes (the administrative term for tribal peoples or ‘Adivasis’) 
in the form of quotas in higher education, public sector and government employment, and 
political representation.16 India also has legislation in place prohibiting hate crimes against 
Scheduled Castes (although unlike the UK, India lacks civil anti-discrimination legislation). 
The same legislation prohibits hate crime against Scheduled Tribes (Adivasis).17  It was 
assumed that as a result of these measures, discrimination, inequality, and violence on 
grounds of caste would be quickly eradicated. This did not happen, and by the early 1980s 
Indian activists had begun to look beyond India, to UN fora and non-governmental 
organisations, for help in challenging the abysmal social and economic conditions and 
discrimination faced by many Dalits (Bob, 2007). As a result of their efforts, by the mid-
1990s the UN human rights system had begun to take cognisance of caste discrimination 
and oppression as a human rights issue. 
 
The response came from two UN bodies in particular: the UN Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination or CERD, the monitoring body of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965 (ICERD, to which India and the UK 
have been parties since 1968 and 1969 respectively); and the former UN Sub-Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council Advisory 
Committee). Racial discrimination is defined in Article 1(1) of ICERD as discrimination on 
grounds of race, colour, descent, national origins, and ethnic origins. In 1996 CERD affirmed 
that caste is captured by Article 1(1), within the sub-category of descent. 18  CERD’s 
interpretation of descent as including caste was reiterated in 2002 in its General 
Recommendation No. 29 in which it affirmed that discrimination based on descent ’includes 
discrimination against members of communities based on forms of social stratification such 
as caste and analogous systems of inherited status which nullify or impair their equal 
enjoyment of human rights.’ 19 In the meantime, in 2000 the then UN Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights declared discrimination based on work and 
descent - a new legal category which includes but is wider than discrimination based on 
caste - to be a violation of international human rights law, commissioning what would be the 
first of three experts’ reports on the phenomenon.20 Since 2002 CERD has enquired about 
discrimination based on descent, including caste and ‘analogous systems of inherited 
status’, in a number of States including India, Japan, Nepal, and the UK. CERD’s 
interpretation of descent as including caste is rejected by India and Japan – although not by 
the UK or Nepal. The UK’s response to recommendations by CERD in 2003 and again in 
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2011 to introduce domestic legislation to address descent-based discrimination including 
discrimination on grounds of caste, rather than challenge CERD’s interpretation of descent, 
has been to argue that the UK does not have a problem of caste discrimination requiring a 
legislative solution (Waughray, 2014).  
 
In Britain there has been a Dalit presence since the 1960s.21 Academic studies show that as 
a ‘minority within a minority’ Dalits in Britain have faced not only ‘external’ discrimination, as 
South Asians, by the majority community but also ‘internal’ discrimination on grounds of 
caste from fellow South Asians.22 The EA now provides comprehensive protection against 
discrimination on nine grounds, or protected characteristics (age, disability, gender 
reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or 
belief, sex, and sexual orientation); but it has been argued that pragmatism rather than 
principle continues to drive decisions as to whether the legislation should be extended 
(O’Cinneide and Lui, 2015). The absence of the term ‘caste’ in British discrimination law prior 
to the EA meant that there was no cause of action for caste discrimination unless claimants 
could successfully argue that caste was subsumed within an existing protected characteristic 
such as race or, after 2003, religion or belief. This remains the case given that caste has not 
yet been explicitly added to the prohibited grounds of discrimination, or protected 
characteristics, in the EA.   
 
In 2000, a UK-based Dalit non-governmental organisation (NGO), Voice of Dalit 
International, organised an International Conference on Dalit Human Rights in London which 
called for caste be added to UK discrimination law, demanding that ‘laws which address 
discrimination based on racism should take cognisance of casteism and place it on a par 
with racism’ (Muman, 2000). The legislation in force at that time, the Race Relations Act 
1976 (RRA), prohibited discrimination on racial grounds, meaning colour, race, nationality or 
ethnic or national origins or by reference to membership of a racial group defined by the 
same grounds. These terms were not defined in the legislation; instead, their meaning was 
developed through case law. Dalit NGOs argued that there was a gap in the existing law 
because caste could not be captured by race or ethnic origins given that perpetrators and 
victims of caste discrimination often shared the same race and/or ethnic origins as then 
understood. In 2005 the then Labour government announced its intention to introduce a 
new, single, Equality Act. Dalit NGOs seized this opportunity to campaign for the addition of 
caste to the legislation, submitting responses to the government’s consultation process, 
collecting and publishing evidence of caste discrimination, organising conferences on caste 
and British equality law, and lobbying parliamentarians.23 This activity was mirrored by those 
opposed to the inclusion of caste in the new legislation, primarily South Asian religious and 
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civil society organisations, who either disputed the existence of caste discrimination 
altogether or argued that there was no such discrimination in spheres regulated by 
discrimination law (Waughray, 2009).  
 
When the Equality Bill was published in April 2009, caste was not included. The 
government’s primary reason was that there was insufficient evidence of a problem requiring 
a legislative solution (for example discrimination occurring in legally-regulated fields); a 
secondary reason was that caste could already be covered by existing protected 
characteristics (Waughray, 2009; Waughray, 2013). Advocates of caste discrimination 
legislation argued not only that such discrimination did occur in both regulated and 
unregulated spheres, but that it could only partially be captured by existing legislation on 
race and religion or belief discrimination, and that to establish in the courts that 
discrimination on grounds of caste is covered by existing legislation would be an extremely 
costly and uncertain process (Waughray, 2009; Waughray, 2014; Dhanda et al, 2014a). 
Between April 2009 when the Bill was published and April 2010 when the EA was adopted, 
caste was transformed from a legally and politically invisible issue to a visible issue, largely 
due to the efforts of Dalit organisations for whom the possibility of securing legal protection 
against caste discrimination in the new legislation was perceived as a once-in-a-lifetime 
opportunity. The question for legislators – indeed, for all - was whether caste could fall within 
the ambit of an existing ground of discrimination. If it could, did this therefore mean that a 
statutory prohibition of caste discrimination was unnecessary? If it could not, did this mean 
that caste should be introduced as a new, distinct, ground? (Waughray, 2009). RRA case 
law on ‘racial grounds’ had focussed on the meaning of ethnic origins rather than race as 
such. The leading case on ethnic origins, Mandla v Dowell Lee (1983), established that 
‘ethnic origins’ or membership of an ethnic group is not synonymous with ‘race’ in a narrow, 
biological sense but is to be construed ‘relatively widely’ in a broad cultural/historic sense. 
For a group to constitute an ethnic group, it must regard itself and be regarded by others as 
a distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics, two of which are essential: a distinct, 
living and long shared history as a group; and a cultural tradition of its own, including family 
and social customs, often but not necessarily associated with religious observance.24  On 
this basis Sikhs, Jews, Romani gypsies, and Irish travellers have been held to be ethnic 
groups; but Rastafarians and Muslims have not.25 
 
Whether and how the Mandla definition could apply to caste groups was unclear. It was by 
attempting to address this question from the mid-2000s onwards that one of the authors first 
drew attention to the challenge of capturing caste in domestic discrimination law.26 It was 
inevitable, given the growing awareness of caste and caste discrimination in the UK, that 
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arguments that ‘ethnic origins’ include caste would eventually come before the courts. In 
2009 the UK Supreme Court in R (E) v JFS had held that ‘ethnic origins’ in domestic law 
includes the notions of a person’s birth, lineage, descent, or ancestry – descent being the 
category in the ICERD definition of racial discrimination which has been affirmed by CERD  
as including caste (see above), although it has never been a category in domestic race 
discrimination legislation. 27  This led successive governments to argue that caste could 
already be covered by race as currently defined in the EA by virtue of the descent aspect of 
ethnic origins; but as has been argued elsewhere, ‘in order to construe caste as part of race 
in domestic law following the JFS route, a three-fold interpretive leap had to be made; caste 
must be viewed as part of descent, itself part of ethnic origins, which in turn is a sub-set of 
race’ (Dhanda et al., 2014a: 15).  
 
The enabling provision permitting caste to be added at a future date ‘as an aspect of’ race 
came to be included in the EA as the result of a last-minute House of Lords amendment to 
the Bill, which was unopposed by the then Labour government due to the need to reach 
agreement on the terms of the Bill before the end of the Parliamentary session. Its inclusion 
was to prove critical to subsequent developments, but it was not the immediate prohibition of 
caste discrimination that Dalit organisations had sought, and it located caste within the 
protected characteristic of race rather than listing it as a separate characteristic. On the other 
hand, its inclusion pursuant to well-publicised debates in Parliament contributed to a legal 
climate which was receptive to the pleading of claims of caste discrimination subsequently. 
By this time, reports by researchers commissioned by Dalit NGOs and community 
organisations detailing examples of caste-related harassment, humiliation and other 
discriminatory behaviour had emerged (Mahimaidass and Sadana (DSN), 2006; ACDA, 
2009). However, these reports were criticised by sceptics and opponents of legislation as 
lacking independence and objectivity.28 In March 2010 the outgoing Labour government 
commissioned research on caste discrimination from the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research (NIESR). Due to its small scale, its evidence was deemed unconvincing by 
some and insufficient by others,29 but it confirmed the existence of caste in Great Britain as 
well as evidence suggesting the occurrence of discrimination based on caste in regulated 
fields (NIESR Report: Metcalfe, 2010). In September 2013 the EHRC, at the request of 
government, commissioned independent research from a team of academics (including the 
present authors) to help inform the introduction of the statutory prohibition of caste 
discrimination pursuant to the requirement in the ERRA. As part of the EHRC Caste in 
Britain research, two events were organised: an experts’ seminar and a workshop for 
extended dialogue between three sets of ‘stakeholders’: representatives of those opposed to 
legislation, those in support, and those responsible for implementing it; and two research 
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reports were published. The gap in perception between the first two sets of stakeholders was 
replayed in the stakeholders’ workshop conducted as a part of the EHRC research (Dhanda 
et al 2014b). The widest divergence was in the written answers to one specific question in 
the statements submitted by stakeholders: ‘Have you directly or indirectly come across any 
instances of discrimination, harassment or victimisation related to the issue of caste in the 
UK? Please give examples if you can.’ Opponents of legislation uniformly answered ‘no’, 
whilst supporters of legislation gave examples of perceived caste discrimination. Following 
the workshop, the Alliance of Hindu Organisations (AHO), one of the main opponents of 
legislation, did shift its position to accept the existence of ‘pockets of discrimination’.30 
 
To understand the divergence of views, partly resting on differing estimates of conceptual 
difficulties in including caste in the EA, we turn now to the meaning of caste and caste 
discrimination both in the international context and in the UK.31  
 
3.   Explaining Caste and Tracking Caste Discrimination 
The meaning of the term ‘caste’, the social phenomena it seeks to capture, the processes 
linked to the perpetuation of caste in one form or another, and the relationship between 
‘caste’, class, and race, continue to be debated in social sciences literature. We agree with 
the historian Susan Bayly (1999: 6) that ‘caste [is] a dynamic and multi-dimensional reality of 
Indian life, rather than an orientalist fiction or monolithic cultural code.’ Diaspora from South 
Asia have continued to practise some forms of ‘caste’ behaviour, and it is clear from the 
existence of the many caste-based organisations in the UK 32 and from the regular online 
advertisements for marital partners specifying ‘Religion/Caste’, (e.g. a Jain/Vania from 
Ealing or a Hindu/Brahmin from Dundee)33 that caste identification is present in the UK.34   
 
The Portuguese origin of the term ‘caste’ from ‘casta’ (Bayly, 1999: 106; Guha, 2014: 21), 
which predates the English word ‘caste’ by more than two centuries, is used by some 
commentators to challenge its ability to capture Indic forms of social organisation. In our 
view this challenge fails to appreciate the ways in which the phenomenon of ‘caste’ has 
repeatedly adapted so as to redefine and reproduce boundaries between groups 
(Vishwanath, 2014). Birth-ascribed status is usually accepted as the basis of membership of 
a bounded group, but this is so only if a person’s group membership is acknowledged by 
others. In the case of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in India, so-named 
because they are listed by caste/tribe name in Schedules to the COI, certificates issued by 
the State authorities identify individuals as members of a Scheduled Caste or Tribe (and 
hence entitled to the benefit of affirmative action measures). In the UK, caste certification 
does not exist, and no-one advocates adoption of this model, hence recognition of inherited 
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caste or tribal status rests either on one’s assignment by others to a particular group or sub-
group, or on one’s own self-definition or self-identification (sometimes through membership 
of caste-based organisations). Similarly, the practice of endogamy (rules which determine 
who can or cannot be a marriage partner) reinforces caste identity. Once labelled with a 
caste/tribal identity, restrictive social interaction, rank ordering of groups, albeit contested, 
and possible discriminatory behaviour may follow.  
 
The earliest Indian references to caste and its origins appear in the Rg Veda (15000 BCE), 
the ancient Sanskrit text which represents Hindu society as divided into four varnas or social 
classes: Brahmin (priests), Kshatriya (warriors, rulers), Vaishya (traders, artisans) and 
Shudra (labourers). In the South Asian context the term caste also refers to the concept of 
jati, meaning hereditary-membership of endogamous ‘caste’ groups, with region-specific 
hierarchical ordering. The concept of jati is cultural and cross-religious; it is not limited to 
Hindus. The number of caste groups (jatis) in India is estimated to be anywhere between 
2000-4000. Data on caste affiliation in the first three British Indian Censuses (1865, 1872, 
1881) were based on the four-fold Hindu varna division but thereafter shifted away from the 
religious to the occupational criterion, i.e. caste as essentially guilds, initiated by Census 
Commissioner Denzil Ibbetson in the 1891 Census (Bannerjee-Dube, 2008: xxxviii) and 
continued until 1935. 
 
The anthropologist Balmurli Natrajan describes the ways in which ‘caste’ is normalised and 
presented as a benign form of cultural grouping when in fact it continues to play a crucial 
role in the exercise and monopoly of social, political, economic, and cultural power (Natrajan, 
2012). In the UK, when victims bring forward claims of harassment, discrimination, or 
victimization on grounds of caste, understanding the normalisation of casteist patterns of 
interaction enables us to recognise the common patterns of behaviour used to stigmatise 
others – looking down on others, attaching prejudicial characteristics to others, treating 
others as unworthy of an equal moral status, considering others ‘unclean’, ostracising others 
if they refuse to follow caste norms, treating others with contempt: these would be some of 
the ways of recognising caste discrimination.  
 
These ‘normalised’ patterns of interaction apply to treatment of tribal peoples as well as 
caste groups, but as pointed out in Dhanda (2014a: 3) ‘sociologically speaking, the 
distinction between caste and tribe is to some extent arbitrary and reified by law’. Tribal 
peoples in particular were ‘primitivized’ and infantilized under colonialism (Chandra 2013: 
161). However, the ‘caste/tribe divide’ is not how ‘colonial subjects saw themselves’; it was 
the Scheduled Districts Act 1874 that ‘separated castes and tribes by law’ (ibid.). The 
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arbitrariness of this distinction is crucial to note in the context of the judgment in Tirkey, 
discussed below. 
 
Dr. Prakash Shah, a legal academic opposed to caste discrimination legislation, has argued 
that the lack of a single, agreed definition of caste reflects a lack of clarity as to what 
concepts the English word ‘caste’ refers to, and that the term has been mapped onto Indian/ 
South Asian cultural phenomena in a way which only distorts them; for these reasons, he 
argues, ‘caste’ cannot and should not be included in the EA (Shah, 2014; Shah, 2015a). 
However, victims of caste discrimination in the UK have not found the lack of a detailed, 
agreed definition of ‘caste’ restrictive in describing the harassment they have had to contend 
with (Kumar, 1990; ACDA 2009). Interviews with Dalit respondents in the West Midlands, 
whilst showing a generational difference in the way the old and the young acknowledge, 
remember, and respond to caste slights (Dhanda, 2014), nonetheless reveal a common 
factor: they all hope that a change in the law would improve conditions for them.  
 
Caste/tribal status in South Asia is tied to unequal access to resources such as land and 
water, opportunities such as education and employment, and to political power, as well as 
acts of humiliation, stigmatisation and, frequently, violence (Thorat and Newman, 2010; 
Guru, 2009). In the different socio-political environment of the UK, humiliations vary in 
degree from subtle forms of disrespect and name-calling (e.g. in schools), through to 
inferiorising of groups, exclusion (e.g. in employment), and refusal of service (DSN, 2006; 
ACDA, 2009; Metcalf and Rolfe, 2010; Dhanda, 2009, 2015; Ghuman, 2011). The EHRC 
Caste in Britain reports noted that caste awareness is not necessarily declining or confined 
to older generations and new cases continue to emerge (Dhanda et al 2014a and 2014b). 
Some of these cases might be legally actionable under the EA if caste is covered by the 
legislation, either by explicit inclusion or via judicial interpretation of existing characteristics. 
But it is important to note that such cases of denigration have the corrosive effect of turning 
routine confrontations into potentially violent conflicts, ultimately far more risky for the victims 
of discrimination than the perpetrators, because of the deepening sense of helplessness with 
every insult that remains unacknowledged as such. In extreme cases, confrontations due to 
caste divides have led to loss of life, even in the UK.35 Unfortunately, there is persistent 
denial of hidden caste prejudice by some of the so-called upper castes who posit caste 
identity as a benign ethnic identity, failing to note that, as argued elsewhere, ‘carrying the 
‘caste mark’ as a confrontational identity in the face of denigration is different from carrying it 
as uncritical mark of pride’ (Dhanda, 2015: 41). The former may be a necessary strategy of  




The difference in the political pressure exerted by competing lobbies on the government of 
the day might end up determining the direction the law will take. In section 5 below, we 
discuss the alternatives open to Government in the light of the judgment in Tirkey which was 
eagerly awaited by all sides in the debate, and which we discuss next.  
 
4.    Case law with special reference to Tirkey v Chandhok & Anor 
The inclusion of caste within ethnic origins has been argued in three cases. The first, Begraj 
and Anor v Heer Manak Solicitors and Ors, a pre-EA case, collapsed in February 2013 
before judgment was reached, due to judicial recusal. 36  The first post-EA caste 
discrimination case in which judgment was reached, Naveed v Aslam and Ors (2012), 
involved a claim of unlawful racial discrimination on account of caste by a Pakistani 
restaurant worker against his employers, the owners of an Indian restaurant. The 
Employment Tribunal (ET) held that the claim of caste discrimination was doomed to failure 
for two reasons; first, because no order had been made extending EA s. 9(1) so as to 
provide for caste to amount of itself to an aspect of race; and secondly because it was 
impossible for the claimant’s caste to fall under the existing definition of ethnic origins given 
that the claimant and respondent were from the ‘same’ caste (described in the judgment as 
the ‘Arain Pakistani caste’); the ET concluded that the claimant was being treated differently 
because of his class, not his caste. As explained elsewhere by one of the authors, the ET 
failed to consider that the Claimant and the Respondents may have been of different sub-
castes or jatis – and hence of different status - within the wider group or caste to which they 
both belonged (Waughray, 2014: 17).  
 
The third case, Tirkey v Chandhok and Anor, concerned an Indian domestic servant 
employed in a private home in the UK. It involved egregious violations of employment rights 
and unlawful discrimination contrary to the EA which the claimant, Ms. Permila Tirkey, 
alleged had occurred for reasons related to her ethnic origins including her perceived status 
in the caste system. There are three judgments in this case: the first, in 2013, followed a 
preliminary hearing in the ET on an application by the Respondents to strike out the caste 
element of the Claimant’s amended claim (Tribunal 2013); the second, in 2014, was a 
judgment of the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) on appeal from the ET’s refusal to strike 
out the amendment (Appeal Tribunal 2014); the third was the judgment in the substantive ET 
hearing in September 2015 (Tribunal 2015).37 Ms Tirkey’s claim was for unpaid wages, 
unfair dismissal, violations of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and the Working Time 
Regulations 1998, direct discrimination or harassment on grounds of race, specifically ethnic  
origins including her inherited position in society in whole or in part because of her caste, 
and direct or indirect discrimination on grounds of religion or belief. Ms Tirkey was recruited 
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in India by the respondents, Mr and Mrs Chandhok, to work for them as a domestic servant 
in their UK home. During the four and a half years of her employment Ms Tirkey was 
subjected to conditions of work and an environment which the ET found violated her dignity 
and created an atmosphere of degradation (Tribunal 2015, 211).  In her evidence Ms Tirkey 
described her family as ‘”Adivasi” [i.e. tribal] people who are dark skinned and poor’, the 
‘lowest class’ in ‘“the caste pyramid”’ (Tribunal 2015, 8).  She described herself as a 
Christian, of the ‘servant class’, ‘“low caste”’, with no employment expectations other than 
domestic service. This evidence was not challenged by the Chandhoks and was accepted as 
fact by the Tribunal (Tribunal 2015, 9-10, 24).  
 
In May 2013 – shortly after the introduction of the ERRA requirement that caste must be 
made an aspect of race in EA s. 9(1) - the claimant was permitted to amend her original 
claim of race and religious discrimination by inserting a new paragraph averring that ‘her 
ethnic and/or national origins includes (sic) but is not limited to her status in the caste system 
as perceived by the Respondents’ (Tribunal 2013, 2; Appeal Tribunal 2014, 6). Her amended 
claim argued that ICERD prohibits discrimination on grounds of descent, descent has been 
interpreted by CERD to include caste, the EU Race Directive adopts the principles in ICERD, 
and the EA implements the Race Directive, therefore the EA should be interpreted as 
prohibiting caste discrimination. In the new paragraph the claimant averred that ‘the and/or a 
reason why she was recruited and treated in the manner alleged was that the Respondents 
concluded she was of a lower status to  them’, and that ‘this view was tainted by caste 
considerations’ (Tribunal 2013, 2; Appeal Tribunal 2014, 6). The Respondents denied all the 
allegations. They applied for the caste discrimination element of the claim to be struck out on 
the grounds that it had no reasonable prospect of success because – following Naveed - the 
Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider it. In a preliminary hearing in December 2013 the ET 
refused the application. The fact that the government had decided to legislate to make caste 
an aspect of the protected characteristic of race was not determinative of the issue (Tribunal 
2013, 26.5). The ET ruled that EA s. 9(1) ‘can and should be construed in such a way as to 
provide for caste discrimination in the context of this case [emphasis added] to be part of the 
protected characteristic of race discrimination’ (sic) (Tribunal 2013, 26.3). The Respondents 
appealed. In December 2014 the Honourable Mr Justice Langstaff (President of the EAT), 
sitting alone, refused the appeal, upheld the ET decision, and referred the case back to the 
ET. He held that ‘though “caste” as an autonomous concept did not presently come within 
the EA s. 9(1) many of the facts relevant in considering caste in many of its forms might be 
capable of doing so since “ethnic origins” had a wide and flexible ambit including 
characteristics determined by “descent”’, and it was ‘possible that the facts found in hearing 
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the present claim might come within the scope of that phrase’ (Appeal Tribunal 2014, 
Summary).  
 
Langstaff P noted that the claimant’s amendment raised ‘no separate claim of caste 
discrimination as such’; yet it was precisely on the basis that the amendment did raise such 
a claim that the application to strike it out was pursued (Appeal Tribunal 2014, 7, 8). He 
identified two central questions; first, whether the predecessor to the EA, the Race Relations 
Act 1976 (RRA), provided a remedy for discrimination in the factual circumstances which the 
claimant proposed in her claim to establish in evidence; second, whether, if so, the fact that 
the EA, as originally enacted and as amended by the ERRA, envisaged the addition of caste 
to s. 9(1) meant that any claim asserting ‘caste’ reasons for less favourable treatment was 
precluded, such that the law no longer provided a remedy for them (Appeal Tribunal 2014, 
33). The answer to the first question lay in the principles expressed in the two principal 
authorities on the scope of race in the RRA, Mandla and JFS,38 the effect of which, he found, 
is to give a wide and flexible scope to the meaning of “ethnic origins” and, given the 
emphasis on the word “origins” in that phrase, descent is, as JFS shows, clearly to be 
included within it, at least where it is linked to concepts of ethnicity (Appeal Tribunal 2014, 
42). Langstaff P also noted that once a statute is enacted it has the meaning that courts 
assign to it; Parliament’s own view as to that which the legislation meant cannot be 
conclusive as to its meaning (Appeal Tribunal 2014, 43). 
 
Langstaff P found that the issue of whether “caste” as a distinct concept exists as a separate 
strand in the definition of race was not determinative; the effect of EA s. 9(5) as amended by 
the ERRA was to clarify or supplement s. 9(1) (the component elements of race), not to 
restrict it (Appeal Tribunal 2014, 44, 52). He concluded that ‘there may be factual 
circumstances in which the application of the label “caste” is appropriate, many of which are 
capable – depending on their facts – of falling within the scope of s. 9(1), particularly coming 
within “ethnic origins”, as portraying a group with characteristics determined in part by 
descent, and of a sufficient quality to be described as “ethnic”’(Appeal Tribunal 2014, 51). As 
a postscript he added that, although the parties may have been hoping for a definitive 
decision in principle that caste discrimination either was, or was not, within the scope of the 
EA, he did not see his role as being to resolve academic disputes or establish more general 
propositions; rather, his focus was the appeal in this particular case, in its particular 
circumstances (Appeal Tribunal 2014, 55). 
 
Judgment in the merits hearing was delivered on 17 September 2015. The ET reiterated the 
EAT’s finding that ‘the fact that there is no single definition of caste [as the parties were 
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agreed] does not mean that a situation to which that label can, in one of its manifestations, 
be attached cannot and does not fall within the scope of “ethnic origins”’ (Appeal Tribunal 
2014, 45; Tribunal 2015, 199). Regarding the race discrimination and/or harassment claim, 
Ms Tirkey’s argument was that her ethnic origins, including her nationality and her hereditary 
position in society (in whole or in part on the basis of her caste) was the reason she was 
treated as she was by the Chandhoks.  
 
The extent of the control, exploitation, humiliation, and negation of personal autonomy 
suffered by Ms Tirkey during the course of her employment with the Chandhoks is evident 
from the judgment. The Tribunal found that she slept at all times on a mattress on the floor 
and was not given a bed; she was denied access to her own passport by the Respondents; 
she had no control over the bank account opened by the Respondents in her name; she 
worked on an ‘on-call’ basis seven days per week which meant that she was unable to 
attend church; her personal freedoms and movement were restricted (for example she was 
not allowed to go out on her own); she was denied access to English language classes; she 
had no access to money and was unable to contact her family or to buy clothes or personal 
effects; she wore second hand clothes not of her choice or taste, provided by the family 
(Tribunal 2015, 251-253). The Tribunal found that Ms Tirkey was recruited in India to work in 
the UK because the Respondents wanted someone of Indian descent, whose inherited 
position was as Ms Tirkey’s: ‘a low caste, servile, Indian person who could not speak 
English.’ They did not seek a UK-based employee ‘because no such person would have 
accepted the intended conditions of work, either as to physical conditions, workload, or 
payment/ non-payment’ (Tribunal 2015, 205-211).  
 
We argue that the conduct described in the judgment is indicative of the normalized 
behaviours of humiliation, exploitation, and control typical within relationships of 
subordination marked by caste and/or tribe difference.39  Such extreme behaviour may not 
be equally evident in other cases of caste and/or tribe discrimination of the kind catalogued 
in the official and community reports noted above; but the judgment provides valuable insight 
as to the patterns and types of behaviour through which caste discrimination and 
harassment are manifested. 
  
5.  Concluding Reflections  
The Government’s present position on the duty to make caste an ‘aspect of race’ in the EA 
following Tirkey is indicated in its responses to written parliamentary questions in November 
and December 2015. In the House of Lords on 10 November 2015, in response to a 
question asking the Government to clarify how the Tirkey judgment has changed the law on 
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caste discrimination, the answer was that ‘the judgment suggests there is an existing legal 
remedy for claims of caste-associated discrimination, under the “ethnic origins” element of 
s.9 EA.’40 When asked on 14 December 2015 why they had not yet published the 2014 
feasibility study on caste discrimination, the Government’s written answer on 21 December 
2015 was: ‘We are currently considering the conclusions and recommendations of the caste 
feasibility study as part of our wider consideration of the implications of the Tirkey v 
Chandhok tribunal judgments.’ 41 We suggest that the implications of Tirkey for the addition 
of caste to the EA are significant but not decisive. In conclusion we explain why we think so. 
 
The ET in Tirkey found, on the basis of the facts, numerous violations of UK employment law 
by the Chandhoks, moreover that they engaged in unwanted conduct which had the purpose 
or effect of violating their employee’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading 
or offensive environment for her contrary to the harassment provisions in s. 26 of the EA.42 
The ET found that this mistreatment was related to Ms Tirkey’s race, specifically her ethnic 
origins, defined as her birth, her descent, her inherited position in society or caste, and her 
background and upbringing. Rather than seek a UK-based employee who would not have 
accepted to be treated in the way it was intended to treat Ms Tirkey, the Chandhoks 
deliberately flouted UK immigration law in order to secure her entry to the UK. 43  The 
Chandhoks knew or believed her to be an Adivasi; Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes/Adivasis in India, despite being differently categorised, legally and administratively (a 
distinction inherited from colonial times – see above), are afforded similar protections by the 
Constitution of India 1950 and by hate crimes legislation, and share a common experience of 
inferiorisation, marginalisation, social exclusion, discrimination, and stigmatisation, on the 
basis of inherited status and hereditary position in society. Ms Tirkey used the term ‘caste’ to 
capture this experience, describing herself as both an ‘Adivasi’ and ‘low caste’ – descriptions 
which were not challenged by the Chandhoks.44 Both these labels are tied to notions of 
descent, origins, inherited social position, in other words to the concept of ethnic origins. The 
key point for the ET was whether, on the evidence, the reason for the mistreatment of Ms 
Tirkey was related to her ethnic origins, whether actual or as perceived by the Chandhoks. 
The ET found that it was.   
 
Ms Tirkey’s legal representatives declared that the judgment renders untenable the 
Government’s opposition to an explicit statutory prohibition of caste discrimination on the 
grounds that there is no evidence of such discrimination taking place in the UK.45  Dalit 
Solidarity Network (DSN) UK on its website acknowledged the ‘excellent outcome for the 
victim’ but cautioned that ‘despite the fact that the judgement appears to allow for caste 
discrimination under race and ethnic origin, this case does not set a precedent and future 
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cases may not be covered by existing legislation.’ 46  Lord Lester QC (Lib Dem) was cited by 
DSN-UK and by the National Secular Society as stating that ‘the decision is of no value as a 
precedent and the Government should not be allowed to use it as an excuse for defying the 
will of parliament.’47 For the Government, the Minister for Women and Equalities, Nicky 
Morgan, when asked in the House of Commons by the chairman of the All Party 
Parliamentary Group for British Hindus, Bob Blackman (Con), shortly after the judgment 
whether the Government would now undertake not only not to trigger the provision on caste 
discrimination in the ERRA ‘but to repeal it so that the Hindu community (sic) will know 
where it stands legally’, responded that because of Tirkey ‘the law as it stands has changed’; 
the judgments in the case ‘suggest that legal protection against such discrimination already 
exists under the Equality Act 2010’. Thus ‘a litigant could now seek to bring a case of caste 
discrimination in an employment tribunal using the ethnic origin provisions in the Equality 
Act, which is why we should take time to look at the judgment before making further 
decisions.’48  
 
The Government has made no comprehensive public statement since Tirkey on the duty to 
make caste an aspect of race. If it considers Tirkey to establish that discrimination on 
grounds of caste is covered through judicial interpretation under existing provisions on race, 
specifically ethnic origins, and that it is therefore unnecessary to make caste an aspect of 
race in the EA, this could lead to a decision to repeal the statutory duty to add caste to s. 
9(1) EA. Alternatively, given the statutory obligation to add caste, the Government could 
decide that naming caste in some way in s. 9(1) would provide greater clarity than exists 
under the current EA formulation of race which does not explicitly include caste, thereby 
‘future-proofing’ caste discrimination protection against the development of case law in 
conflict with Tirkey.  
 
Making caste an aspect of race in the EA would bring other aspects of the legislation into 
play, for example the public sector equality duty, and the exceptions provisions applicable to 
community groups and associations. Alternatively, at this stage the government could do 
nothing and simply allow matters to develop through case law. As a first-tier Tribunal 
decision, the merits judgment in Tirkey is of persuasive value but has no binding authority as 
a precedent. However it can only be appealed on a point of law; and the point of law in 
question here, namely whether ethnic origins in the EA can include caste, was determined 
by the EAT whose decision preceded the ET hearing and which, as a legally-binding 
judgment, the ET was obliged to follow. Unless and until the EAT judgment is overruled by a 
higher court, lower tribunals are obliged to follow it. However, seen through the eyes of 
potential victims of caste discrimination, a legitimate fear remains that Tirkey may be 
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overruled in the future, leaving them potentially unprotected unless and until the position that 
caste discrimination is covered by the existing prohibition of race discrimination becomes 
common ground and accepted beyond challenge, or until the position is confirmed by the 
Supreme Court.  
 
It is our view that even if the precedential value of Tirkey is ultimately limited, the judgment is 
valuable in addressing the ‘problem’ of ‘no definition’ of caste. The lack of an agreed 
definition of caste has annoyed opponents of caste discrimination legislation for some time 
(even though neither race nor ethnic origins are defined in statute); however, Langstaff P 
ruled that the lack of a single definition of caste ‘does not mean that a situation to which that 
label can, in one of its manifestations, be attached cannot and does not fall within the scope 
of “ethnic origins”’ (Appeal Tribunal 2015, 45).  Tirkey illustrates that where discrimination is 
evident or inferable from the facts, the ET will proceed to ask whether the discrimination is 
related to the relevant protected characteristic – in this case, race, specifically ethnic origins, 
including notions of inherited status/ and/or caste/ and/or inherited position in society.  
 
However, for the facts to come to light, the claimant has to break out of the silence that is 
sometimes self-imposed because ill-treatment is a part of normalised conduct. Some victims 
may feel that this is all someone of their status can expect, and the perpetrator may fail to 
notice the effect of their exploitative or harassing behaviour. In the case of Ms Tirkey, the 
exploitative relationship she suffered continued for four and a half years before erupting into 
a confrontation between her and her employers, and leading to a complaint to the ET which 
required the support of an NGO, the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit, to come to 
Tribunal.   
 
From the perspective of victims of caste discrimination, the critical outcome is that such 
discrimination is acknowledged, recognised, and is prohibited by law. Tirkey v Chandhok has 
opened up the possibility of bringing claims of caste discrimination in the Employment 
Tribunal via the interpretive route using ethnic origins in EA s. 9(1)(c), a possibility 
anticipated in Dhanda et al (2014a: 25). It must be stressed that a significant role in 
facilitating the outcome in Tirkey was played by the passage of ERRA s. 97 in April 2013 
preceded by the inclusion in 2010 of the ‘caste power’ in EA s. 9, both of which drew on the 
work of NGOs, parliamentarians and academics in making visible the hidden phenomenon of 
caste discrimination. It would be premature, even provocative, to repeal EA s. 9(5)(a) on the 
basis of the judgment in Tirkey, despite pressure from some quarters to do so. For the 
victims of caste discrimination, such a move would be retrogressive and would be seen as 
abandoning those who need protection. Extending the EA by secondary legislation, as 
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decided by Parliament in April 2013, to include caste as an aspect of race (however this is 
done), offers legal certainty and proclaims publicly that discrimination on grounds of caste is 
both unacceptable and unlawful.49 Without the EA and the discretionary ‘caste power’ which 
was included at the last minute in s. 9(5)(a), and its amendment in 2013 to become a duty, 
caste might not have been pleaded as a ground of discrimination, or part of one, in Tirkey (or 
indeed in Naveed). The EA and its amendment have surely increased the traction of caste 
as a ground of discrimination. However, the unfinished process of embedding protection 
against caste discrimination within the EA detracts from the otherwise positive assessment 
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